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IT DOESN’T PASS THE SELL TEST: FOCUSING ON
“THE FACTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL CASE” IN
INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION INQUIRIES
Susan A. McMahon*
In November 2002, Herbert J. Evans, a 74-year-old with a long history of
paranoid schizophrenia, walked into a United States Department of Agriculture
Service Center in Wytheville, Virginia, to complain about a past due notice on
his USDA loan.1 Evans quickly became angry and, after ranting about the
United States’ descent into Communism, told the USDA employee that he had
lived his life and “would not ‘mind taking a few with me.’”2 Evans was arrested
and charged with forcibly assaulting, intimidating and interfering with an em-
ployee of the United States while the employee was engaged in her official duties.3
After his arrest and a mental evaluation, the court determined he was incompetent
to stand trial.4 The only hope for restoring him to competency was the administra-
tion of antipsychotic medications, which Evans refused.5 The government moved
to have him medicated against his will.6
Thus began Evans’ long and circuitous route through the criminal justice
system. For the next four years, Evans was held at a prison medical facility while
his case proceeded through several district court hearings and two appeals.
During his time of confinement, he allegedly threatened to kill the federal judge
hearing his case and was charged with that additional crime.7 At some point, the
courts decided the government interest in prosecuting Evans for these crimes was
“important” because the crimes with which he was charged were “serious.”8 At no
point did the courts consider whether Evans’ lengthy history of mental illness or
the fact that his crime was likely intimately intertwined with this illness under-
mined this government interest.
Criminal defendants who are incompetent to stand trial have a significant liberty
interest in refusing the antipsychotic medication that could restore their compe-
* Associate Professor of Legal Research and Writing, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to
thank Sonya Bonneau, Matthew Foley, Jeffrey Shulman, and Tom Spoth for their wise comments on earlier drafts.
Many thanks also to Joseph Rogan for his excellent research assistance and to Georgetown University Law Center
for the writing grants and administrative support that made this Article possible. © 2013, Susan A. McMahon.
1. United States v. Evans, 293 F. Supp. 2d 668, 669–70 (W.D. Va. 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 670.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. United States v. Evans, No. 102CR00136, 2004 WL 533473, at *1 (W.D. Va. Mar. 18, 2004).
8. United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 238 (4th Cir. 2005).
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tency. Intrusion upon that right is “a deprivation of liberty in the most literal and
fundamental sense.”9 However, as with all constitutional rights, an individual’s
interest in making autonomous decisions concerning medical treatment can be
outweighed when important government interests are at stake. In Washington v.
Harper, the Supreme Court held the government interest in medicating inmates
who pose a danger to themselves or others was sufficiently important to overcome
a prisoner’s right to refuse the medication.10 Riggins v. Nevada applied the same
reasoning to criminal defendants. Even though they had not been convicted of any
crime, as the inmates in Harper had, defendants in pretrial detention could be
medicated against their will when they posed a danger to themselves or others.11
Sell v. United States applied the Harper and Riggins reasoning well beyond the
context of dangerous individuals. In Sell, the Court held that an incompetent,
non-dangerous defendant could be medicated for the sole purpose of bringing him
to trial.12 To do so, the government must show: (1) important government interests
are at stake; (2) involuntary medication will significantly further those interests;
(3) involuntary medication is necessary to further those interests; and (4) the
administration of the drugs is medically appropriate.13 These factors, drawn from
Harper and Riggins, require courts to evaluate the potential side effects of a
proposed drug, the likelihood of restoration to competency with the medication,
the availability of any alternate courses of action, the seriousness of the charged
crime, and the special circumstances of the individual case.14
Given these criteria, the Supreme Court cautioned that instances where a
defendant was medicated solely for the purpose of prosecuting him “may be
rare.”15 However, that has not turned out to be the case. Since Sell, lower courts
have approved the involuntary medication of incompetent defendants in over
sixty-three percent of cases, including many cases in which the defendant was
charged with a crime involving no physical damage to people or property or a
crime that was indisputably a manifestation of the individual’s mental illness.16
The involuntary medication of non-dangerous defendants, predicted to be a “rare”
occurrence, has instead become routine.
The problem rests with the structure of the test, consisting of four separate
threshold factors, and its tilt in favor of the government. For example, with the
9. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 237–38 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court
undervalued the respondent’s liberty interest).
10. Id. at 227.
11. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992) (holding defendant should not have been administered
antipsychotic drugs during the course of trial without finding there were no less intrusive alternatives, the
medication was medically necessary, and it was essential for the sake of the defendant’s safety or safety of others).
12. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003).
13. Id. at 180–81.
14. Id. at 179–81.
15. Id. at 180.
16. See infra Part III.
388 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:387
government interest factor, a court’s only task is to decide whether this interest is
important. If it is, that box on the four-factor list is checked. The court does not
then balance that government interest against the defendant’s countervailing
interest in refusing medication. The use of a checklist comprised of threshold
factors favors the issuance of involuntary medication orders because the court
need not consider the defendant’s interest in avoiding what the government seeks
to do, “which necessarily involves physically restraining defendant so that she can
be injected with mind-altering drugs.”17
Moreover, the final three boxes on the checklist, which compel the court to
answer medical questions about the efficacy of the antipsychotics and the risk of
side effects, will be met in the vast majority of cases. The medical community has
concluded that antipsychotic medication is the “gold standard” for patients with
psychotic symptoms, and statistical studies have shown the medication works and
side effects can be managed.18 Barring unusual circumstances, these three boxes
will be checked.
Therefore, the first factor—whether the government interest at stake is impor-
tant—is often the only barrier between a defendant and involuntary medication. To
show that a government interest is important, the government must prove the
alleged crime is “serious.”19 Federal courts have found alleged crimes ranging
from illegal reentry to credit card fraud to qualify as serious.20 It is the rare federal
crime that falls outside this category.
Yet the seriousness of the crime is not the only criterion. A court must also
consider “the facts of the individual case” when evaluating the importance of the
interest.21 For example, the government may have less of an interest in prosecuting
a defendant who has already been confined for a significant amount of time or
likely will be confined to an institution for the mentally ill.22 Some courts have also
looked to the nature of the crime, whether violent or nonviolent,23 as well as the
government’s likelihood of success on the underlying criminal charge24 when
17. See United States v. Lindauer, 448 F. Supp. 2d 558, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 630 F.3d 1314, 1324–26 (11th Cir. 2011) (ordering involuntary medication
and crediting testimony of Dr. Robert Sarrazin, who said antipsychotic medication was the “gold standard” for
treating patients with schizophrenia and studies showed an 87% chance of restoration to competency).
19. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003).
20. See, e.g., United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding credit card fraud to be a serious
crime because defendant was charged with crimes that involve a maximum statutory penalty of over ten years);
United States v. Sanchez-Cruz, No. EP-07-CR-144-DB, 2007 WL 4190692, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2007)
(finding illegal reentry to be a serious crime because of the penalty defendant would face if convicted).
21. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
22. Id.
23. See White, 620 F.3d at 419–21 (holding forcible medication was not permissible, in part because the
charged crimes were entirely nonviolent).
24. See United States v. Lindauer, 448 F. Supp. 2d 558, 571–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting the indictment
charged defendant with a crime—conspiring to act or acting as an unregistered agent of the government of
Iraq—which she could not have committed without influencing normal people, and even lay people recognized
she was seriously disturbed).
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assessing the government interest.
The “facts of the individual case” analysis therefore provides an opportunity for
the defendant to push the importance of the government interest below the
threshold for satisfying the first factor of the Sell test. If warranted by the
individual circumstances, the defendant can erase the checkmark usually placed
there by default because he committed a “serious” crime. However, this consider-
ation has largely gone unrecognized in the lower courts. Courts have instead
become mired in discussions about drug dosages, treatment plans, and side effects.
Because resolving these questions of medication specifics usually results in a
finding that the drugs will be effective in restoring the defendant to competency
with few severe side effects, the medication of incompetent criminal defendants
has become commonplace.
In this Article, I explore the contours of the overmedication problem and offer as
the solution a more robust assessment of the facts of the individual case under the
government interest factor. Part I summarizes in broad strokes the medical and
legal background of involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication,
including the current state of medical knowledge about the treatment of psychotic
disorders and the Supreme Court’s series of decisions on involuntary medication
of inmates and defendants. These decisions led to Sell v. United States, the
controlling authority on the involuntary medication of defendants for the purpose
of standing trial, which I analyze in Part II. Part III demonstrates the medication of
defendants often takes place despite looming questions about the strength of the
government’s interest in prosecuting the defendant, due to the structure of the legal
test and the misunderstandings surrounding the important government interest
factor. Part IV proposes placing a new emphasis on this factor and its individual-
ized assessments to identify those exceptional cases where involuntary medication
is warranted.
I. MEDICAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION
A. Medical Background
Patients deemed incompetent to stand trial suffer from a wide array of mental
illnesses, many of which are classified as “psychotic disorders.”25 Mental illnesses
that fall into this category include schizophrenia, brief psychotic disorder, and
delusional disorder.26 Studies have shown that medications can successfully
control the psychotic symptoms of many of the disorders in this category.27 These
25. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders groups disorders with prominent psychotic
symptoms as “Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorders.” AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 87 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V].
26. Id. at 88–89.
27. ROBERT M. JULIEN ET AL., A PRIMER OF DRUG ACTION 95 (12th ed. 2011); see also Douglas Mossman,
Unbuckling the “Chemical Straitjacket”: The Legal Significance of Recent Advances in the Pharmacological
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medications can be generally categorized into two groups—the first-generation
typical antipsychotics and the second-generation atypical antipsychotics—and,
while their efficacy rates are generally the same, their side effect profiles differ
significantly.28 Whether a defendant is involuntarily medicated with a typical or
atypical antipsychotic usually depends on the availability of injectable forms of the
medication, the defendant’s past experiences with particular medicines, and the
treating psychiatrist’s personal preferences.29
1. Psychotic Disorders
The constellation of disorders considered “psychotic” includes symptoms such
as delusions, hallucinations, catatonic behavior, disorganized speech, and negative
symptoms, such as diminished emotional expression.30 The specific diagnosis
depends on which combination of symptoms a patient presents and how long a
patient has had active symptoms.31 With schizophrenia, for example, the patient
must show some signs of the disturbance, resulting in impaired occupational or
social functioning, for six months or more.32 In addition, for at least one of those
six months, the patient must present with one or more of the following symptoms:
delusions, hallucinations, or disorganized speech.33 Patients with delusional disor-
der, another illness characterized by psychotic symptoms, suffer from delusions,
unaccompanied by any of the other above symptoms, for at least one month.34
While many disorders fall within the spectrum of psychotic disorders, schizo-
phrenia is the most common and most studied.35 Schizophrenics generally suffer
from two different kinds of symptoms: positive symptoms and negative symptoms.
Positive symptoms, which reflect an excess or distortion of normal functions,
Treatment of Psychosis, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1033, 1048 (2002) (“[S]cientific evidence ha[s] shown
overwhelmingly that schizophrenia was a brain-based illness that could be addressed effectively, though not
cured, with pharmacological agents . . . .”).
28. JULIEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 95–97; see also Brief for the American Psychiatric Ass’n as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664), 2003 WL 176630, at *15–19.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Steward, No. 06-864-MRH, 2009 WL 4839529, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14,
2009) (citing medical report recommending injections of Prolixin, a first-generation drug, which can be delivered
in long-acting injectable form, reducing compliance issues); United States v. Mesfun, No. 05-858(WHW),
2009 WL 1704308, at *4 (D.N.J. Jun. 17, 2009) (citing psychiatrist’s testimony that she would be forced to use
long-acting injectable antipsychotics; only three types of antipsychotics were available in such form); United
States v. Cortez-Perez, No. 06 CR 1290 WQH, 2007 WL 2695867, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2007) (ordering
treatment with Haldol, a first-generation drug, after psychiatrist testified that defendant had been successfully
treated with Haldol in the past with manageable side effects).
30. DSM-V, supra note 25, at 87–88.
31. Id. at 88–89.
32. Id. at 100–01.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 92.
35. See JULIEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 91 (discussing only schizophrenia, and no other psychotic disorders, in
relation to antipsychotic drugs and noting that schizophrenia affects one percent of the population); Mossman,
supra note 27, at 1043–44 (focusing discussion on schizophrenia).
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include hallucinations, delusions, or disordered thinking.36 Individuals suffering
from disordered thinking, one of the more prominent outward symptoms of
schizophrenia, jump from one topic to another, provide answers that are unrelated
to questions, or are nearly incomprehensible.37 Negative symptoms, which reflect
a loss of normal functions, are more difficult to treat.38 Affect flattening, one
common negative symptom, is characterized by a lack of facial expressions, poor
eye contact, and reduced body language.39 Other negative symptoms include a
lack of interest in participating in goal-directed activities and sitting still for long
periods of time.40
Other psychotic disorders have similar symptomatic presentations to schizophre-
nia, but have a shorter duration (e.g., schizophreniform disorder, in which
symptoms only last from one to six months) or are accompanied by additional
symptoms (e.g., schizoaffective disorder, in which psychotic symptoms are accom-
panied by a major mood episode).41 For example, many defendants in Sell hearings
have been diagnosed with delusional disorder, a psychotic disorder in which a
patient suffers from delusions unaccompanied by any of the other symptoms of
schizophrenia.42 Individuals suffering from delusional disorder do not express the
disordered thinking or cognitive impairments known to affect schizophrenics.
But for their delusions, they can be high-functioning individuals.43 Only about
0.2 percent of the population suffers from this disorder.44 However, they account
for at least twenty-one percent of defendants in reported Sell cases,45 perhaps
because these individuals are associated with litigious behavior. They have been
known to file multiple lawsuits or send hundreds of letters of protest to government
and judicial officials.46
Much remains unknown about these disorders and their causes. With regard to
schizophrenia, the general medical consensus is that the disorder is due, at least in
part, to malfunctions in the brain because its symptoms indicate an “underlying
disruption in functional neural circuitry.”47 However, there is no single biological
36. See JULIEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 299.
37. Id. at 300.
38. Id. at 299; see also id. at 301.
39. Id. at 301.
40. Id.
41. See DSM-V, supra note 25, at 97–98, 106–07.
42. See id. at 92.
43. Id. at 93.
44. Id. at 92.
45. This number is based on a review of the seventy-seven federal district court cases decided under Sell
through May 31, 2012. See infa note 143. In sixteen of those cases, defendants received an uncontested diagnosis
of delusional disorder. In several other cases, testifying psychiatrists disagreed on the proper diagnosis where at
least one psychiatrist believed the defendant suffered from delusional disorder.
46. DSM-V, supra note 25, at 92.
47. Mossman, supra note 27, at 1056–57 (quoting Nancy C. Andreasen, A Unitary Model of Schizophrenia:
Bleuler’s “Fragmented Phrene” as Schizoencephaly, 56 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 781, 782 (1999)); see also
Samuel Jan Brakel & John M. Davis, Overriding Mental Health Treatment Refusals: How Much Process is
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or genetic cause of the disease. Multiple factors, including environmental ones,
may contribute to the disturbances in brain function and development that result in
schizophrenia.48 There is no test that allows physicians to definitively diagnose
schizophrenia,49 and no cure exists.50 Medication can successfully manage the
positive symptoms of the disease,51 but once a patient stops taking the medication,
symptoms may return.
2. Antipsychotic Medication
All antipsychotics are generally effective.52 They treat the positive symptoms of
psychosis and should have a partial antipsychotic effect immediately, followed by
further therapeutic effects over the course of six to eight weeks.53 Most patients
have some response to the drugs but also have continuing symptoms.54 While the
drugs usually do not achieve total remission of symptoms, between sixty and
eighty percent of patients have moderate to good long-term responses to medica-
tion.55 When it comes to the short-term restoration to competency, the outcomes
are even better: eighty-seven percent of individuals improve to the point that they
are able to understand the charges against them and assist their attorney in their
defense.56
The antipsychotic medications target the positive symptoms of schizophrenia
and are most effective at diminishing these symptoms. The negative symptoms
of schizophrenia remain stubbornly resistant to treatment, persisting between
episodes of positive symptoms.57 Some research has indicated that second-
generation antipsychotics might be more successful in treating negative symp-
toms, but more recent studies have contradicted this conclusion.58
While effective at controlling the positive symptoms of psychotic dis-
orders, antipsychotic medications can be accompanied by significant side effects.
The most common serious side effects are extrapyramidal symptoms, which are
“Due”?, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 501, 508 (2008) (“[S]chizophrenia and other major mental disorders are bio-
logically based and so, therefore, are the treatments of them.”).
48. Robert Freedman, Schizophrenia, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1738, 1739 (2003).
49. Mossman, supra note 27, at 1060 (“[T]he diagnosis of schizophrenia remains a ‘low tech,’ clinical
process.”).
50. DSM-V, supra note 25, at 102 (“[M]ost individuals with schizophrenia still require formal or informal
daily living supports, and many remain chronically ill.”).
51. Freedman, supra 48, at 1746 (“All antipsychotic drugs are effective for positive symptoms of acute
psychosis.”).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1742.
54. Id.
55. ANTHONY J. ROTHSCHILD, THE EVIDENCE-BASED GUIDE TO ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATIONS 7 (2010).
56. Brian Ladds et al., Involuntary Medication of Patients Who Are Incompetent to Stand Trial: A Descriptive
Study of the New York Experience with Judicial Review, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 529, 538–39 (1993).
57. DSM-V, supra note 25, at 102 (“Negative symptoms . . . tend to be the most persistent.”).
58. JULIEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 97.
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characterized by various movement disorders that can mimic the effects of
Parkinson’s disease. Akathisia, which is one such side effect, affects about
twenty percent of patients taking first-generation antipsychotics.59 Patients af-
flicted with this particular side effect suffer from anxiety, restlessness, pacing,
constant rocking back and forth, and other meaningless repetitive actions.60
Patients undergoing long-term treatment with the older antipsychotics are also at
risk of developing a permanent neuromotor syndrome known as tardive dyskine-
sia, which is characterized by involuntary tongue protrusions, lip smacking,
puckering of the lips, and rapid tic-like movements of the face.61 In rare cases,
patients develop a potentially fatal side effect, neuroleptic malignant syndrome, in
which the patient develops a fever, severe muscle rigidity, and, in the worst cases,
falls into a coma.62
Second-generation drugs avoid many of these more dangerous side effects.
These antipsychotics, which include risperidone, olanzapine, quetiapine, and zip-
rasidone, treat the positive symptoms of schizophrenia as effectively as the older
drugs without the accompanying danger of extrapyramidal side effects.63 How-
ever, these drugs are not unaccompanied by risk. Individuals on the new antipsy-
chotics can gain weight and develop diabetes, with the consequent negative impact
on their long-term health.64 Some of the second-generation anti-psychotics have
also been known to cause neuroleptic malignant syndrome.65 When choosing the
antipsychotic to be used for a particular patient, psychiatrists generally prefer
second-generation medications because of their more favorable side effects
profile.
B. Legal Background
Courts began to rule on the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medica-
tion in the 1970s, as they became the common means of treating psychotic
disorders. Prior to Sell, two Supreme Court cases addressed the issue. In Wash-
ington v. Harper, the Court established that mentally ill inmates have a right to
refuse antipsychotic drugs and determined this right could be overcome when the
prisoner was a danger to himself or others.66 Riggins v. Nevada recognized
defendants in pretrial detention had the same liberty interest in freedom from
unwanted medication as inmates and this interest could be overcome if the
government showed the antipsychotic medication was essential to protect the
59. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 55, at 28.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. JULIEN AT AL., supra note 27, at 106.
63. Id. at 96.
64. Id. at 117–19.
65. Id. at 106.
66. 494 U.S. 210, 221–22, 227 (1990).
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defendant’s safety or the safety of others.67 Left unanswered was the question of
whether a defendant who presented no risk of danger to himself or others could be
medicated for the sole purpose of rendering him competent to stand trial. In Sell v.
United States, the Court, relying almost solely on Harper and Riggins, held the
government could involuntarily medicate such a defendant,68 thus substantially
broadening the circumstances under which a defendant could be injected with
antipsychotic drugs against his will.
1. Washington v. Harper
Walter Harper was sentenced to prison in 1976 for robbery.69 For the majority of
his incarceration, he was housed in the Washington State Penitentiary’s mental
health unit, where he consented to the administration of antipsychotic drugs.70
The government released Harper on parole in 1980 on the condition that he
continue to receive mental health treatment; it revoked his parole after Harper
assaulted two nurses at a hospital in Seattle.71 Upon Harper’s return to prison,
psychiatrists successively diagnosed him with three mental illnesses: manic-
depressive disorder, schizoaffective disorder, and schizophrenia.72 After first
consenting to take antipsychotic medication, Harper later refused these treat-
ments.73 The prison psychiatrist sought to medicate the prisoner under a state
policy which allowed involuntary treatment if an independent committee deter-
mined that certain criteria had been met.74 The committee approved the medication
of Harper, and Harper filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting the involuntary
administration of antipsychotic drugs without a judicial hearing violated the Due
Process, Equal Protection, and Free Speech clauses of the United States and state
constitutions.75 The question before the court was whether the administrative
proceeding at the prison afforded sufficient due process, or whether a judicial
hearing was required.76
The Washington Supreme Court decided the case in Harper’s favor, finding
he had a liberty interest in refusing unwanted medication, and the “highly intru-
sive nature” of that treatment warranted greater procedural protections than
those afforded Harper under the state’s procedure for administering medication.77
The court held that only a judicial hearing, and its accompanying panoply of
67. 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992).
68. 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003).
69. Harper, 494 U.S. at 213.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 214.
72. Id. at 214 n.2.
73. Id. at 214.
74. Id. at 214–16.
75. Id. at 217.
76. Id. at 213.
77. Id. at 218.
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adversarial protections, could satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.78
The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the administration of unwanted
medication to Harper violated neither substantive nor procedural due process
protections.79 The procedural due process issue was whether the state’s non-
judicial mechanisms for administering medication were sufficient; the substantive
issue required that the Court define the contours of the protected constitutional
interest in freedom from medication. The Court ultimately found the non-judicial
proceeding satisfied the requirements of procedural due process, but, in the course
of its decision, it clarified whether and when an inmate may refuse antipsychotic
medication, i.e., the substantive due process issue.
On this question, the Court held that (1) an inmate has a “significant” liberty
interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the
Due Process Clause, and (2) the interest can be overcome if the inmate is
dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the defendant’s medical
interest.80 The liberty interest at stake is “not insubstantial” because the “forcible
injection of medication into a non-consenting person’s body represents a substan-
tial interference with that person’s liberty.”81 The Court also noted that, despite
their therapeutic effects, antipsychotic drugs carry significant risks of serious, even
fatal, side effects.82
Nevertheless, the extent of this liberty interest had to be evaluated “in the
context of the inmate’s confinement,” and the Court recognized even funda-
mental rights may be limited by “legitimate penological interests.”83 In the prison
context, the government had a legitimate and important interest in combating the
danger posed by an inmate both to himself and to others.84 A prison regulation
that was “reasonably related” to this interest would survive due process scrutiny.85
The policy at issue in this case allowed the medication of inmates who were
mentally ill and who, as a result of their illness, were gravely disabled or
represented a significant danger to themselves or others. This policy was reason-
ably related to the government interest in protecting a prisoner from inflicting harm
upon himself or others, and the Court held that it survived due process scrutiny.86
This case, therefore, established the right to refuse antipsychotic medication and
78. Id.
79. Id. at 218, 220–21.
80. Id. at 221–22, 227.
81. Id. at 229.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 222–23.
84. Id. at 225.
85. Id. at 223 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
86. Id. at 227.
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identified circumstances under which intrusion upon that right would not violate
due process.87
2. Riggins v. Nevada
Left unanswered by Harper were the questions of whether defendants in pre-
trial detention—individuals who, unlike inmates, had not been convicted of
any crime—possessed the same interest in freedom from unwanted medication,
and when government interests could override this right. In Riggins v. Nevada, the
Supreme Court determined the Due Process Clause affords at least as much
protection to individuals detained for trial as it does for inmates.88
David Riggins was accused, and ultimately convicted, of stabbing and killing
Paul Wade in the early morning hours of November 20, 1987.89 Riggins presented
an insanity defense at trial and testified that he heard voices in his head that
said killing Wade was justified.90 At the time he testified, he was being given
800 milligrams a day of Mellaril, an antipsychotic drug.91 He originally consented
to the administration of the drug, but later moved for a court order suspending the
use of Mellaril until the end of his trial.92 The district court denied the motion in a
one-page order that did not provide its rationale.93
Riggins appealed the case to the Nevada Supreme Court, arguing that the
government intruded upon his right to freedom from unwanted medication and the
forced administration of Mellaril interfered with his right to a fair trial because it
“denied him the ability to assist in his own defense and prejudicially affected his
attitude, appearance, and demeanor at trial.”94 The Nevada Supreme Court rejected
these arguments, holding that, although Riggins’ unmedicated demeanor was
relevant to his insanity defense, the denial of the defense’s motion to terminate
medication was neither an abuse of discretion nor a violation of Riggins’ trial
rights because an expert witness informed the jury of the effects of Mellaril on the
87. Id. at 221–22, 225–27. In a lengthy dissent to the Court’s evaluation of the merits, Justice Stevens argued
the majority undervalued the significance of the right to refuse the administration of antipsychotic drugs,
believing this fundamental liberty interest to be “deserving [of] the highest order of protection.” The dissent
identified three different dimensions of the liberty interest: (1) a bodily intrusion that created a substantial risk
of permanent injury and premature death; (2) a degrading action that overrode a competent person’s choice to
reject a specific form of medical treatment; and (3) a forced alteration of the will and mind of the subject, which
Justice Stevens called “a deprivation of liberty in the most literal and fundamental sense.” Because the policy at
issue did not adequately protect this fundamental right, the decision of the Washington Supreme Court should
have been affirmed, Justice Stevens argued. Id. at 237–38, 241 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
88. 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992).
89. Id. at 129, 131.
90. Id. at 131.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 129–30 (explaining it was Riggins who first mentioned the Mellaril treatment).
93. Id. at 131.
94. Id.
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defendant’s demeanor and testimony.95 The court did not consider whether the Due
Process Clause was violated by the administration of medication, and it affirmed
Riggins’ conviction and death sentence.96
The Supreme Court reversed, finding the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
were violated. It held there was “a strong possibility Riggins’ defense was im-
paired due to the administration of Mellaril” because it might have had an impact
on his outward demeanor, the content of his testimony, and his ability to
communicate with counsel.97 The Court also considered the due process ques-
tion that went unaddressed in the lower courts and found no evidence to support
the conclusion that the administration of Mellaril was necessary to accomplish
an essential state policy.98 The Court applied the Harper standard to detained
individuals and stated the government would have satisfied the requirements of the
Due Process Clause if it had shown the administration of medication was
necessary for the sake of the defendant’s safety or the safety of others.99
While the potential trial prejudice and the failure to consider the due process
question was sufficient for the Court to reverse the Nevada Supreme Court, it noted
in dicta that another kind of showing might satisfy the strictures of due process—a
showing that the State could not obtain an adjudication of Riggins’s guilt or
innocence by using less intrusive means.100 In other words, if Riggins was not
dangerous, the government’s interest in bringing Riggins to trial may have justified
involuntary treatment. The Court skirted a decision on whether this government
interest would suffice because Riggins did not argue in the lower courts that he had
a right to refuse the Mellaril if the discontinuation of the drug rendered him
incompetent; he only argued administration of the drug denied him a full and fair
trial.101
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, focused on the possibility that a
defendant could be forced to take medication for the sole purpose of rendering him
competent to stand trial.102 He believed the government had to make an extra-
ordinary showing in those circumstances to satisfy the Due Process Clause and he
had “doubt[s] that the showing can be made in most cases, given our present
understanding of the properties of these drugs.”103 Justice Kennedy reached this
conclusion because he believed the government must show “there is no significant
risk that the medication will impair or alter in any material way the defendant’s
95. Id. at 132.
96. See id.
97. Id. at 137.
98. Id. at 138.
99. Id. at 135.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 136.
102. Id. at 138–39.
103. Id. at 139.
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capacity or willingness to react to the testimony at trial or to assist his counsel.”104
Justice Kennedy explored those risks in depth and expressed particular concern
about the potential of the medication to alter a defendant’s demeanor and ability to
cooperate with counsel.105 These side effects have the potential to “prejudice all
facets of the defense,” raising serious due process concerns about government
manipulation of the evidence (the evidence being the defendant himself).106 The
concurrence held up as one example the chance that the medication could cause the
defendant to be restless and unable to sit still. This kind of behavior might create a
negative impression in the trier of fact, which “can have a powerful influence on
the outcome of the trial.”107
Absent a showing “that the side effects will not alter the defendant’s reactions or
diminish his capacity to assist counsel,” the government must resort to involuntary
commitment—not involuntary medication—in the vast majority of cases of
incompetence, Justice Kennedy argued.108 If the defendant cannot be tried without
involuntary treatment and its accompanying impact on the defendant’s demeanor,
then, in Justice Kennedy’s view, society must “bear this cost in order to preserve
the integrity of the trial process.”109
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, upon which the later Sell decision heavily
relied, primarily focused on the side effects of antipsychotic drugs and their
potential impact on a defendant’s demeanor during trial and his ability to assist
counsel. The Sell decision’s overwhelming concern with side effects—two of the
four factors of the Sell test are related in some way to that question—is derived
mainly from this concurrence. But, as discussed in Part II, the formulation of these
factors in Sell left much room for the government to overcome a court’s concerns
about side effects, whereas Justice Kennedy doubted such a showing could ever be
made.110
II. SELL V. UNITED STATES
With the case of Charles Thomas Sell, the Supreme Court addressed the
question that remained unanswered in Riggins: whether a defendant had the right
to refuse antipsychotic medication when the government’s only purpose in
administering that medication was to render the defendant competent to stand trial.
It concluded that, like Harper and Riggins, Sell did possess such a right, but if an
104. Id. at 141.
105. Id. at 143–45.
106. Id. at 142.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 143.
109. Id. at 145.
110. Justice Thomas filed a dissent in Riggins, in which he stated the Supreme Court should not consider
Riggins’ due process argument because it had not been raised in the courts below, but should instead focus only on
whether Riggins had a full and fair trial. Id. at 152. Because Riggins did have the fundamentally fair trial
guaranteed by the Constitution, the conviction should be affirmed, Justice Thomas argued. Id. at 146.
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“important” government interest were at stake and other criteria—such as ensuring
the defendant would not suffer from side effects that would interfere with his
ability to assist counsel—were met, the government could force the medication
upon the defendant without violating the Due Process Clause.
Petitioner Sell was a troubled dentist who believed the gold he used for fillings
was contaminated by Communists, and he once called the police to report a
leopard outside his office, boarding a bus.111 He was hospitalized for psychotic
symptoms on at least two occasions.112 In May 1997, the government charged
Sell with submitting fictitious insurance claims for payment.113 A federal magis-
trate judge found Sell currently competent, but added the caveat that Sell might
experience a psychotic episode in the future.114 The judge released Sell on bail.115
The following year, the government claimed Sell had sought to intimidate a
witness.116 At the bail revocation hearing, Sell was “totally out of control,” hurling
“personal insults” and “racial epithets” and spitting in the judge’s face.117 The
magistrate revoked Sell’s bail.118
In early 1999, Sell asked the magistrate to reconsider his competence to stand
trial.119 After evaluation at the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners
at Springfield, Missouri, the magistrate found Sell was mentally incompetent to
stand trial and ordered him hospitalized for treatment.120 Two months later, staff at
the Medical Center recommended that Sell take antipsychotic drugs, which he
refused to do.121 The magistrate judge ordered the involuntary medication,
concluding “anti-psychotic medications are the only way to render the defendant
not dangerous and competent to stand trial.”122 The district court overturned the
magistrate’s conclusion that Sell was dangerous, but affirmed the order on the
basis that the drugs were medically appropriate, represented the only viable hope
of rendering the defendant competent to stand trial, and were necessary to serve the
government’s interest in obtaining adjudication of the defendant’s guilt or inno-
cence.123 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order.124
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Breyer, looked to
Harper and Riggins (including Justice Kennedy’s Riggins concurrence) to answer
111. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003).
112. Id. at 169–70.
113. Id. at 170.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 171.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 173.
123. Id. at 174.
124. Id. at 172–75.
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the question of whether forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to render a
defendant competent to stand trial unconstitutionally deprived a defendant of his
right to refuse the medication. From these cases, the Court concluded such
medication was permissible, but only when: (1) important government interests
were at stake; (2) involuntary medication would significantly further those
interests; (3) involuntary medication was necessary to further those interests; and
(4) administration of the drugs was medically appropriate.125 The Court cautioned
that circumstances in which all four factors were met “may be rare.”126
This prediction was due to the specific—and, in the Court’s view, difficult—
showings the government needed to make under each of the four factors. First, the
government must show that important government interests are at stake, and the
Supreme Court stated the government had an important interest in trying those
accused of serious crimes against persons or property.127 The Court failed to define
what qualified as a “serious” crime, and lower courts have since struggled to
identify the crimes that clear this bar. The two major approaches to evaluating the
severity of the crime are (1) whether the defendant is entitled to a jury trial,
meaning the maximum possible penalty is over six months imprisonment, and
(2) whether the crime is against persons or property.128 Regardless of which
measure courts use, this standard is generally met. Only four of the seventy-seven
cases analyzed for this Article involved crimes the court held were not serious.129
The Sell opinion also contained a caveat: even when faced with a serious crime,
courts must consider the “facts of the individual case” when evaluating the
importance of the government interest.130 The Court identified two such circum-
stances when the importance of the government interest could be lessened: (1) the
defendant had already been confined for a significant period of time, for which he
would receive credit for any sentence eventually imposed, and (2) the defendant
would potentially be confined for a lengthy period to an institution for the mentally
ill.131 The Court also noted the government has a “concomitant, constitutionally
essential interest” in ensuring the defendant’s trial is fair.132
These circumstances are only examples. Other circumstances, not spe-
cifically listed in the decision, could also potentially weaken the government’s
125. Id. at 180–81.
126. Id. at 180.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 237 (4th Cir. 2005) (using maximum statutory term of
imprisonment when holding the crime of threatening a federal judge serious); United States v. Barajas-Torres,
No. CRIM.EP-03-CR-2011KC., 2004 WL 1598914, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Jul. 1, 2004) (holding crime of illegal
reentry was not serious because it was not a crime against persons or property); see also David M. Siegel,
Involuntary Psychotropic Medication to Competence: No Longer an Easy Sell, 12 MICH. ST. U.J. MED. & L. 1, 8
(2008).
129. See infra Part III.
130. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003).
131. Id.
132. Id.
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interest. Courts therefore must look at all of the facts of the individual case when
determining the relative strength of the government interest. For example, a court
may look to the facts surrounding the crime—such as whether the crime itself
appears to be a manifestation of the individual’s mental illness—to determine
whether the government’s interest in prosecuting the defendant is sufficiently
important. As discussed further in Part IV, a handful of courts have already
proceeded down this path,133 while some scholars have advocated this analysis as a
backdoor means of decriminalizing mental illness.134 Sell allows for consideration
of such facts under the important government interest factor.
Second, for a court to find that involuntary medication will significantly further
important state interests, it must find the administration of the drugs is both
substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial and substan-
tially unlikely to have side effects that will interfere significantly with the de-
fendant’s ability to assist counsel in conducting a trial defense.135 Here, the Court
cited Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Riggins, but substantially weakened the
standard set out in the concurrence. The Court’s concern about side effects was
restricted to those effects that interfered with the defendant’s ability to assist
counsel. The Court neglected to mention Justice Kennedy’s concern about the
medication’s impact on a defendant’s demeanor and the consequent jury prejudice
that may arise.136 Also, under Sell, the government need only show that it is
substantially unlikely that the defendant will suffer the relevant side effects. Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence would bar medication altogether unless the government
could show the medication will not alter the defendant’s reactions or diminish his
capacity to assist counsel.137
Third, medication is necessary to further government interests only if any
alternative, less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same
results.138 If nondrug therapy may be effective in restoring the defendant to
competence, that avenue must first be exhausted. A court must also first consider
less intrusive means for administering the drugs, such as a court order requiring the
medication, before resorting to methods more intrusive upon the body.139 How-
ever, the Court neglected to mention that both Harper and the Riggins concurrence
found that no alternative means are as effective at controlling psychotic symptoms
133. See United States v. Weinberg, 743 F. Supp. 2d 234, 237 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding the government did not
have an important interest in prosecuting the defendant for threatening a judicial officer when “such a threat seems
quite consistent with Weinberg’s illness . . . .”); United States v. Lindauer, 448 F. Supp. 2d 558, 571–72 (S.D.N.Y
2006) (finding the government did not have an important interest in prosecuting a defendant for acting as an agent
of the Iraqi government when “even lay people recognize she is seriously disturbed”).
134. See Gregory B. Leong, Sell v. U.S.: Involuntary Treatment Case or Catalyst for Change?, 33 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 292, 293 (2005).
135. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142–45 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
136. Id.
137. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 143.
138. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003).
139. Id.
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as antipsychotic drugs.140 Practically, no other means work at all. This factor is
therefore easily met in nearly all cases.
Fourth, the court must conclude the drugs are medically appropriate, meaning
they are in the best medical interest of the patient in light of his condition. The
analysis here is broader than that contained in the second factor because a court
must consider all the side effects, not only the ones that impair a defendant’s ability
to assist his counsel. Here, courts must take a close look at the specifics of the
drugs involved because “[d]ifferent kinds of antipsychotic drugs may produce
different side effects and enjoy different levels of success.”141
When framing the relevant question, the Court placed its focus on these final
three factors: whether the government “in light of the efficacy, the side effects, the
possible alternatives, and the medical appropriateness of a particular course of
antipsychotic drug treatment,” showed a need for that treatment “sufficiently
important” to overcome the individual’s protected interest in refusing it.142 Since
the Sell decision, the question of the relative importance of the government interest
has been lost in a blizzard of information about efficacy, side effects, and medical
appropriateness. The end result: the approval of unwanted medication in over
sixty-three percent of cases.
III. MISREADING SELL
The application of this test has not resulted in the “rare” instances of involuntary
medication contemplated by the Court. Rather, as of May 31, 2012, federal district
courts granted motions to medicate in forty-nine of seventy-seven cases, a success
rate of just over sixty-three percent.143 The majority of these defendants allegedly
committed crimes involving no physical damage to people or property, and the
crimes at issue were often a clear manifestation of the individual’s mental disorder.
See, for example, the case of Denise Gail Kimball, who believed voices on
television were warning her of dire events, which she needed to report to law
enforcement.144 She told the court that she had successfully predicted several
events in the past, including a sniper attack in New Jersey, a widespread computer
140. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 141 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“For many patients, no effective alternative exists
for treatment of their illnesses.”); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 226 (1990) (“[T]here is little dispute in the
psychiatric profession that proper use of the drugs is an effective means of treating and controlling a mental
illness . . . .”).
141. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
142. Id. at 183.
143. This number was calculated by identifying federal district court cases reported via Lexis Advance and
WestlawNext that cited to Sell and (1) addressed the substantive involuntary medication issue (i.e., cases using
Sell for its analysis of the collateral order doctrine were excluded), (2) were in the context of rendering individuals
competent to stand trial (i.e., post-conviction cases, such as those involving parole violations, were excluded), and
(3) granted or denied the government’s motion to medicate (i.e., cases that ordered further briefing or were
decided on non-Sell grounds (rendering the medication issue moot) were excluded).
144. United States v. Kimball, No. CR03-1025, 2004 WL 3105948, at *2 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 23, 2004).
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virus, and the sinking of a ship in the Atlantic Ocean.145 The government charged
Kimball with willfully providing false information concerning a threatened attack
on a mass transportation facility.146 The district court ordered her medicated.147
Another example may be found in the case of Barbara Michelle Bush, who was
charged with two counts of threatening a federal judge while she was pursuing a
civil pro se lawsuit. By her own account, she had filed over 100 such lawsuits.148
Bush sent a letter, unrelated to the litigation, to three federal judges, which quoted
a 1907 treatise on self-defense. Her letter read:
Barbara Michelle Bush’s intentional infliction of (or, if she misses, her intent to
inflict) physical harm upon the other . . . is said to be justified when she acts in
proper self-defense against [three federal judges] . . . .
Thus, according to Maryland criminal law, Barbara Michelle Bush may slay
any of such persons or all of them, if it reasonably appears to her to be
necessary so to do to protect herself from anymore great bodily harm or
death.149
Bush sent the same language in a second letter to the district court, this time with
the words “NO THREAT” written in bold across the top of the page.150 After the
second letter, Bush was arrested and charged with two counts of threatening a
federal judge.151 Bush argued she had no intent to commit the crime because the
government’s psychiatrists concluded Bush was likely suffering from delusions at
the time she sent these letters.152 The district court ordered her medicated.153
Bush and Kimball are not outliers. A large percentage of these cases involve
mentally disturbed individuals doing mentally disturbed things, such as making
nonsensical threats against federal officials or warning of non-existent impending
disasters. For example, fifteen out of the forty-nine federal cases in which the
defendant was ordered medicated, or almost one-third of the cases, involved the
crime of threatening a federal official or threatening property (such as a false bomb
threat). While these cases might teeter on the brink of crimes of violence, the very
fact that these individuals are facing Sell hearings, rather than being medicated
145. Id.
146. Id. at *1.
147. Id. at *5.
148. United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806, 809–10 (4th Cir. 2009).
149. Id. at 810.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 811.
152. Id. at 814.
153. Id. at 813. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit concluded the special circumstances of the case—including the
likelihood that the government would not be able to prove the requisite intent—were outweighed by the important
governmental interest in bringing Bush to trial. It nevertheless vacated the district court’s order and remanded for
further proceedings because the district court had not applied a clear and convincing standard to the evidence—
the standard set by the Fourth Circuit for the first time in Bush—and because the treatment plan failed to provide
adequate detail about the drugs and side effects of the medication that would be administered to Bush. Id. at
814–15.
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under the Harper dangerousness standard, indicates that mental health profes-
sionals do not believe these individuals were likely to carry out their threats.
Instead, these crimes are nothing more than an outward manifestation of the
symptoms of mental illness, activity undertaken in response to the delusions
associated with schizophrenia or delusional disorder. They may be “serious”
crimes—courts defined them as such when they ordered defendants medicated—
but the fact that these individuals are in the criminal justice system, rather than
mental hospitals, is a symptom of the criminalization of mental illness and the
malfunctioning of the mental health system,154 extensive problems that are beyond
the scope of this Article.
While Sell did not address those deep systemic issues, it did create an off-ramp
within the government interest factor so that these defendants did not need to
suffer through years of incarceration and medication against their will.155 But the
issuance of so many medication orders in Bush- and Kimball-like cases indicates
courts are not taking advantage of this approach. These skewed outcomes are
occurring for two reasons: (1) courts overemphasize the questions surrounding the
efficacy of the medication and its side effects, which will almost always be decided
in the government’s favor, and (2) courts underemphasize the question of whether
the government’s interest is important.
A. Overemphasis on Medication and Side Effects
Three of the four Sell factors are medical considerations: whether the drug is
likely to work without producing significant side effects, whether there are any
other options for treatment, and whether the drug is medically appropriate for the
patient. In the vast majority of cases, the evidence on each of these factors will
support medicating the defendant.156 Because these factors take up three of the
154. See generally PETE EARLEY, CRAZY: A FATHER’S SEARCH THROUGH AMERICA’S MENTAL HEALTH MADNESS
(2006); E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., CRIMINALIZING THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL: THE ABUSE OF JAILS AS MENTAL
HOSPITALS (1992).
155. Several scholars have argued the Sell test is misguided because it places too many barriers to involuntary
medication and does not serve the best medical interests of the defendants, who would benefit from treatment.
See, e.g., Samuel Jan Brakel & John M. Davis, Overriding Mental Health Treatment Refusals: How Much Process
Is “Due”?, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 501, 566–68 (2008). Brakel and Davis, for example, recommend a “medical”
approach to involuntary medication that would allow physicians to treat defendants if such treatment is medically
proper. Id. at 585. While this argument is compelling—treatment with antipsychotics would almost undoubtedly
improve the lives of defendants—implementation would require a substantial overhaul of the involuntary
medication regime and reversal of several Supreme Court precedents. This Article takes no position on whether
defendants would be better off if the barriers to involuntary medication were loosened; they well might be.
Instead, this Article looks specifically at involuntary medication for the purpose of restoring competence for trial
and determines whether the Sell test is being effectively implemented, given the Supreme Court’s suggestion that
orders in such circumstances will be rare and stating a preference for using other avenues that justify involuntary
medication. Solutions to the more extensive problem of the undermedication of mentally ill individuals are
beyond the scope of this Article.
156. See Dora W. Klein, Curiouser and Curiouser: Involuntary Medications and Incompetent Criminal
Defendants After Sell v. United States, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 897, 906–14 (2005).
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four steps of the analysis, and they will almost always be met, defendants find
themselves fighting an uphill battle to avoid medication. These factors have placed
undue emphasis on whether the medication will work and what the side effects will
be, at the expense of considering whether it should be administered at all.
1. Efficacy and Side Effects
When courts analyze whether the drugs will significantly further government
interests, they need to answer two questions. First, are the drugs substantially
likely to return the defendant to competency?157 Second, are they substantially
unlikely to have side effects that hamper the defendant’s ability to assist coun-
sel?158 The medication works for most psychotic individuals; therefore, the Sell
inquiry requires that courts determine whether a defendant is in that small
percentage of individuals who do not respond to medication or who suffer serious
side effects. Yet, unless the defendant has been treated with the proposed
antipsychotic in the past, it is difficult to predict with certainty what the outcome
for that defendant will be.159 Psychiatrists and courts therefore justifiably rely on
the averages.
Antipsychotics generally work. Psychiatrists testifying in Sell cases have
generally relied on personal experience and studies as support for this conclusion.
In United States v. Algere, for example, the court found this element was met when
the testifying psychiatrist relied on (1) a seventy to eighty percent success rate in
her personal experience with treating patients; (2) a New York study that found
eighty-seven percent of involuntarily medicated felony defendants were restored
to competency; and (3) the American Psychiatric Association’s “Practice Guide-
lines for the Treatment of Patients with Schizophrenia,” which indicated that
seventy percent of first-episode schizophrenics achieve remission of psychotic
symptoms after three to four months of treatment with antipsychotics.160 Psychia-
trists testifying in other cases with schizophrenic defendants have relied on some
combination of similar sources. Courts have found these sources sufficient to
support a conclusion that antipsychotics are substantially likely to return a
defendant to competence.161
157. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003).
158. Id.
159. See Klein, supra note 156, at 910–11. But see Douglas Mossman, Predicting Restorability of Incompetent
Criminal Defendants, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 34, 41 (2007) (identifying two circumstances in which a
defendant has a low chance of restoration to competency: (1) when defendant has long-standing psychiatric
disorder that has resulted in lengthy periods of hospitalization and (2) when defendant has an irremediable
cognitive disorder, such as mental retardation).
160. 396 F. Supp. 2d 734, 742–43 (E.D. La. 2005).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 161–62 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding district court’s reliance
on Bureau of Prison’s seventy percent success rate in treating patients was not clearly erroneous); United States v.
Bedros, No. 06-249 (NGG), 2008 WL 2437865, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 13, 2008) (relying on government
psychiatrist’s testimony that, based on his personal experience, schizophrenic patients have an eighty percent
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Antipsychotics also generally do not result in side effects that interfere with
a defendant’s ability to assist counsel, although the outcomes here are much
less certain than with the effectiveness of the medication, given the plethora of
possible side effects and the inability to predict which side effects will strike which
defendants. For example, twenty percent of patients on first-generation antipsy-
chotics suffer from the symptom of akathisia, which is characterized by restless
movements.162 A court has no way of predicting which patients will fall into that
twenty percent. And if the twenty percent is too high a risk for this defendant, it
must be too high a risk for all defendants—prohibiting the medication of every
defendant in every case.163
Despite the fact that these medications generally work and generally are not
accompanied by uncontrollable side effects, this factor has been the most litigated
among the four factors. Many courts, frustrated by the generalities inherent in the
efficacy predictions, have required more specificity before authorizing involuntary
medication. The Ninth Circuit, for example, requires district courts to make
specific findings about the drug’s impact on a particular patient.164 It stated:
It does not follow that because the use of a product is designed to accomplish
an end, it does so. Nor does it follow that it is substantially likely that it will do
so, let alone substantially unlikely that it will have unintended adverse effects.
Because the second factor of the Sell test requires the government to show by
clear and convincing evidence what it is substantially likely that the involun-
tary medication regimen will do (and what it is substantially likely that it will
not do), the government cannot satisfy its burden by showing what the
involuntary medication regimen is designed to do.165
What this decision fails to recognize is that psychiatrists are usually armed with
little more information than what the medication is designed to do. Unless the
chance of competency restoration; he later revised that estimate down to sixty percent because the defendant had
schizophrenia, disorganized type, which was not addressed in the literature).
162. E.g., ROTHSCHILD, supra note 55, at 28.
163. There is also some question of whether akathisia and the other motor control side effects associated with
antipsychotics would be side effects that would affect the defendant’s ability to assist counsel. The Supreme Court
seemed most concerned with potential sedative side effects of antipsychotics. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S.
166, 185 (2003) (“Whether a particular drug will tend to sedate a defendant, interfere with communication with
counsel, prevent rapid reaction to trial developments, or diminish the ability to express emotions are matters
important in determining the permissibility of medication to restore competence . . . .”). Few courts have
acknowledged that the list of side effects that may fall into the category of those that interfere with the defendant’s
ability to assist counsel may be small. But see United States v. Mesfun, No. 05-858 (WHW), 2009 WL 1704308, at
*18 (D.N.J. June 17, 2009) (discounting evidence of side effects because none of the side effects in the record
would impact a defendant’s ability to assist counsel).
164. United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 696 (9th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Hernandez-
Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908, 916–17 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that, at a minimum, an involuntary medication order must
include the medication to be administered, the maximum dosage, and the length of time that treatment may
continue).
165. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 696.
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defendant has taken the medication previously, there is no certainty as to what the
medication will do, only what it is likely to do. The kind of individualized
assessment desired by the Ninth Circuit in this case more properly belongs in the
court’s analysis of the government interest factor, as argued in Part IV below.
2. Alternatives to Treatment
With the third factor, whether the medication is necessary to further government
interests, the government needs to show that no alternative, less intrusive treat-
ments will restore a patient to competency.166 Barring truly unusual circumstances,
this factor will be met. Only antipsychotics can help a defendant achieve compe-
tence; there is simply no other method that works as well.167 As many psychiatrists
have testified, the major alternative—talk therapy—is unlikely to work because, as
one court stated, “a patient has to be receptive to that kind of therapy for it to be
effective.”168 Defendants “who have a distorted perception of reality,” as most
defendants suffering from psychotic symptoms do, are generally not receptive to
therapy.169 Even psychiatrists testifying on behalf of the defendant have admitted
there is little chance of success with any avenue of treatment other than anti-
psychotic medication. As one district court succinctly stated, “[o]n this point, the
experts are united: there is no other alternate treatment that is likely to achieve
substantially the same result . . . .”170 Therefore, this factor, too, should fall in the
government’s favor in nearly every case.
3. Medically Appropriate
Under the final factor, the government needs to show that the drugs are
medically appropriate, or “in the patient’s best medical interest in light of his
medical condition.”171 This question, too, will usually be decided in favor of the
government. The analysis under this factor is somewhat broader than the side
effects question in the second factor, which is only limited to those side effects that
will hamper the defendant’s ability to assist counsel.172 Despite this different
formulation of the consideration, the test will still be satisfied in nearly every case.
166. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
167. Some courts first require the defendant be presented with a court order backed by the court’s contempt
power in an effort to force the defendant to take the medication. See, e.g., United States v. Burhoe, 692 F. Supp. 2d
137, 144–45 (D. Me. 2010). To the extent that this is defined as an “alternative” treatment, it is the only one that
potentially could restore a defendant to competency. However, this method often does not work for the same
reason talk therapy does not work: it requires a willing defendant. See United States v. Algere, 396 F. Supp. 2d
734, 745 (E.D. La. 2005) (“Considering that Algere remains incompetent, continues to refuse all medication and
has indicated that he thinks the Court is part of a conspiracy against him, a Court order threatening contempt
would be unlikely to affect Algere’s willingness to take the medication.”).
168. Algere, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 745.
169. United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 2004).
170. United States v. Decoteau, 857 F. Supp. 2d 295, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
171. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003).
172. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
408 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:387
Courts have largely deferred to psychiatrists’ testimony that antipsychotic
medications are the standard—and likely the only—treatment for schizophrenia
and other psychotic disorders. In United States v. Algere, for example, the court
agreed with the psychiatrist’s report, stating “[a]ntipsychotic medication is the
standard treatment for [defendant’s] condition . . . .”173 In United States v. Gomes,
the court found the administration of antipsychotics to be medically appropriate,
citing to the treating psychiatrist’s testimony that the defendant’s condition “is
such that he needs . . . treatment [with] anti-psychotics. It is medically appropriate
to treat a debilitating illness.”174
Moreover, some courts have found this factor to be satisfied by reasoning that
the medication not only advances the government’s interests, but also is in the best
interests of the patient. In United States v. Milliken, for example, the court found
this factor satisfied when it considered the benefits medication would have for the
defendant’s long-term health (“if not treated, Defendant’s condition may worsen”)
and his trial strategy (“antipsychotic medication will help the Defendant assist his
counsel by making his delusions less prominent”).175 The same benefits accrue to
any defendant ordered to take medication.
While it is true that psychotic disorders are debilitating and medication is
generally an appropriate treatment, some defendants with certain medical issues
may be more at risk of particular side effects. For example, second-generation
antipsychotics may exacerbate a diabetic’s condition.176 Yet, even in these in-
stances, psychiatrists regularly testify that they can monitor the side effects of
drugs and adjust treatment plans if the side effects become severe. Courts have
accepted these explanations as sufficient to satisfy this factor.177 Thus, even in
circumstances where there may be some question as to whether the administration
of the drug is medically appropriate, involuntary medication is being approved.
There are few instances where it would be “medically appropriate” to leave
schizophrenia or other psychotic disorders untreated. These drugs are in wide use
exactly because they are “medically appropriate” for these individuals. For that
reason, this factor, too, will usually be satisfied.178
173. United States v. Algere, 396 F. Supp. 2d 734, 745–46 (E.D. La. 2005); see also, e.g., United States v.
Aleksov, No. 08-057-M (AK), 2009 WL 1259080, at *3 (D.D.C. May 7, 2009) (“[T]he Court concludes that the
administration of medication is medically necessary, as it is the common and standard course of treatment for
Defendant’s psychotic condition.”).
174. Gomes, 387 F.3d at 163.
175. No. 3:05-cr-6-J-32TEM, 2006 WL 2945957, at *14 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 12, 2006).
176. JULIEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 96.
177. See United States v. Bedros, No. 06-249 (NGG), 2008 WL 2437865, at *2, *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 13, 2008);
United States v. Archuleta, No. 2:05CR0676 TC, 2006 WL 2476070, at *4 (D. Utah Aug. 24, 2006).
178. See Dora W. Klein, Unreasonable: Involuntary Medications, Incompetent Criminal Defendants, and the
Fourth Amendment, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 161, 192–93 (2009) (“All antipsychotics do have the potential to cause
very disabling and even life-threatening side effects. But given that schizophrenia is itself very disabling and even
life-threatening, it is the rare person with schizophrenia for whom antipsychotic medications can be declared
medically inappropriate.”) (footnotes omitted).
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B. Underemphasis on Facts of the Individual Case
In the majority of cases, the decision on the final three factors should not be a
close call, and the court can check off three of the four boxes of the Sell test.
However, the court still must determine whether the government interest at stake is
“important.” And it is here that the Supreme Court required that courts take the
defendant’s individual circumstances into account. Government interests must be
considered in light of the “facts of the individual case,” and “special circumstances
may lessen” the importance of the interest.179 However, courts have largely
neglected this individualized assessment in favor of a more streamlined analysis.
Under the approach favored by many courts, an interest is judged important if the
crime is “serious” and the two “special circumstances” identified in Sell are not
present.
Courts have consistently held that the charges faced by the defendants are
serious, an unsurprising result because “[n]early every felony can be described as
‘serious.’”180 Evidence of this default position comes from the cases themselves.
Since Sell was decided, courts in only four out of seventy-seven cases have held
that a crime was not serious. Courts have called “serious” crimes as varied as credit
card fraud, sending threats via fax, and illegal reentry.181
The critical question, then, becomes whether the government’s interest in
prosecuting a serious crime is lessened due to the facts of the individual case. The
Court proposed two possible circumstances that might undermine this interest:
when the defendant could be subject to a lengthy civil commitment, and when the
defendant has already been confined for a significant period of time. However, it
did not restrict lower courts to those two possibilities.182 It also noted its concern
with broader questions of fairness and purpose, stating the defendant’s trial must
be “a fair one,” and noting courts must consider whether “bringing such an
individual to trial alone justif[ies] in whole (or at least in significant part)
administration of a drug that may have adverse side effects, including side effects
that may to some extent impair a defense at trial . . . .”183
Yet, few lower courts have considered this issue beyond a mention of the two
special circumstances set out by the Supreme Court. While the Court envisioned
an all-encompassing analysis of the “facts of the individual case” when determin-
ing whether the government’s interest in prosecution is sufficiently important to
justify medication, the analysis in the lower courts has fallen far below that bar.
179. United States v. Sell, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003).
180. United States v. Schloming, No. 05-5017 (TJB), 2006 WL 1320078, at *6 (D.N.J. May 12, 2006).
181. United States v. Nicklas, 623 F.3d 1175, 1178 (8th Cir. 2010) (discussing the transmission of a threatening
communication in interstate commerce); United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 410–11 (4th Cir. 2010) (discussing
credit card fraud); United States v. Sanchez-Cruz, No. EP-07-CR-144-DB, 2007 WL 4190692, at *3 (W.D. Tex.
Nov. 19, 2007) (discussing illegal reentry).
182. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
183. Id. at 183 (emphasis in original).
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In Kimball, for example, the court found the government had an important
interest in prosecuting a delusional defendant who tried to provide an airline
with information about an upcoming attack on mass transit. The supposedly
impending attack was the product of the defendant’s delusional belief that she
was receiving messages through voices on her radio and television.184 The court’s
conclusion that prosecuting this defendant was “undoubtedly important” was
based on nothing more than the fact that the maximum prison term for the charge
was twenty years.185 The court did not consider whether the defendant’s individual
circumstances—in particular, the fact that her crime was the direct result of her
delusions—lessened the government’s interest in prosecuting her.
A similar situation occurred in Bush. In that case, the court did not consider
whether the defendant’s individual circumstances, particularly her delusional state
at the time she sent the letters, lessened the importance of the government’s interest
in prosecuting the case. The government conceded that Bush was likely delusional
when she sent the letters, labeled “NO THREAT,” to the federal judges.186 That
fact went unconsidered. Instead, the court found that, even though there was a
strong possibility that Bush would only be sentenced to time served, the govern-
ment interest remained important because (1) prosecuting her for this conduct
sent a message about its seriousness; (2) a conviction would subject Bush to a
period of supervised release; and (3) a conviction would lead to restrictions on
certain activities, like owing a firearm.187 The court gave no consideration to the
defendant’s individual circumstances and instead found that the government
interest was strengthened by the general benefits of punishment.
In sum, courts tend to find the government interest at stake is important in
the majority of cases, but give little consideration to the defendant’s particular
circumstances. The facts of the individual case, which should be the primary
bulwark between a defendant and medication, have been brushed aside in favor of
a single-minded focus on medication dosages and treatment plans—an analysis
that rarely supports anything other than a medication order. The result: a multitude
of defendants who have been medicated against their will, many of whom end up
confined in prison for years before they even can be brought to trial.
IV. FOCUSING ON THE FACTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL CASE
By emphasizing the impact of individual circumstances on the government
interest, courts would involuntarily medicate fewer defendants and more clearly
identify those exceptional cases where medication for the sole purpose of prosecut-
ing a defendant is warranted. Although several courts have already incorporated
184. United States v. Kimball, No. CR03-1025, 2004 WL 3105948, at *1–2 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 23, 2004).
185. Id. at *3.
186. United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806, 814–15 (4th Cir. 2009).
187. Id. at 815.
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individual circumstances into their Sell analyses, many mistakenly place this
consideration into their discussion of medication efficacy and side effects, rather
than their assessment of the government interest.
Evans provides one such example. In Evans, the Fourth Circuit chided the lower
court for failing to treat the defendant as an individual. However, the court only
considered the defendant’s individual circumstances when analyzing the medica-
tion’s efficacy and side effects, not the strength of the government interest. In its
analysis, the court cautioned against accepting the generalized rationales that
psychiatrists had provided in other cases:
Instead of analyzing Evans as an individual, the [psychiatrist’s] report simply
sets up syllogisms to explain its conclusions: (1) atypical antipsychotic medi-
cations are generally effective, produce few side effects, and are medically
appropriate, (2) Evans will be given atypical antipsychotic medications,
(3) therefore, atypical antipsychotic medication will be effective, produce few
side effects, and be medically appropriate for Evans. To hold that this type of
analysis satisfies Sell’s second and fourth factors would be to find the
government necessarily meets its burden in every case it wishes to use atypical
antipsychotic medication. We do not believe that Sell’s analysis permits such
deference.188
While the Evans court was correct that such blanket generalities are insufficient
to satisfy Sell, it failed to recognize that courts would always rely on some level of
generality when assessing the impact of a medication on individual defendants
because individual reactions are impossible to gauge in advance. Since generalities
will always be a part of the analysis of the second and fourth factors, the proper
place for the assessment of a defendant “as an individual” is instead with the
government interest factor. A consideration of the facts of the individual case—
including the nature of the individual’s crime—would help courts identify those
cases where the government interest is not just “important,” but important enough
to justify medication.
The Fourth Circuit’s later decision in United States v. White adopted this
approach in its analysis of the government interest factor.189 Defendant Kimberly
White stood accused of six felonies involving credit card fraud and aggravated
identity theft.190 White’s co-defendant pled guilty to three counts, and the court
sentenced her to thirty-six months in prison.191 Psychiatrists diagnosed White with
delusional disorder, grandiose type, and the court found that she was incompetent
to stand trial.192 After a Sell hearing, the court ordered that White be medicated
188. United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 241 (4th Cir. 2005).
189. United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 404–05 (4th Cir. 2010).
190. Id. at 405.
191. Id. at 415–16.
192. Id. at 405.
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against her will.193 The Fourth Circuit reversed that order. Focusing only on the
first Sell factor, the court found that “special circumstances,” such as the three
years White had already been incarcerated, sufficiently undermined the govern-
ment interest in bringing White to trial.194 In addition to this usual consideration
of length of incarceration as a special circumstance, the court also took into
account factors not explicitly stated in Sell, including (1) the nature of White’s
crime, (2) the lack of public safety concerns, and (3) the unexceptional nature of
the case.195
First, the court noted while the alleged crimes were technically “serious,” their
severity was low relative to other crimes.196 For example, the alleged crimes were
non-violent, which lessened the government’s prosecutorial interest.197 The vic-
tims of the credit-card fraud were also corporations, so prosecution would not
provide restitution or any “conceivable benefit” to the corporate victims.198 Fur-
ther, no individuals were harmed, and there was no evidence that White was likely
to commit future crimes of violence.199 The relative lack of present and future
harm was sufficient to distinguish White’s crimes from those of the defendant in
Bush, who was accused of threatening a federal judge, a crime that contained the
possibility of future violence.200
Second, the court found public safety concerns in this case were significantly
diminished because, as someone who has been adjudicated as mentally defective,
the defendant could never obtain or own a firearm under federal law.201 A con-
viction was therefore unnecessary “insofar as it would safeguard the public from
any possible acts of gun violence from her.”202 Again, this factor distinguished
White from Bush, where, given the defendant’s potentially violent activities
(threatening a federal judge), prosecution was justified in order to limit the
defendant’s subsequent activities under her supervised release program, including
the ability to obtain and own firearms.203
Third, the court conducted a more general totality of the circumstances-type
analysis to determine whether the circumstances of the case, taken as a whole,
193. Id. at 409.
194. Id. at 413.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 419.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. The court principally uses this line of argument to distinguish White from Bush and Evans, in which the
court found the first Sell factor was met, even though the defendants in those cases would probably exceed their
likely sentence by the time they were convicted (like White). See id. (“The non-violent nature of White’s crimes
principally distinguishes this case from Bush and Evans.”).
201. Id. at 419–20.
202. Id. at 420.
203. The court does not explain why, under federal law, Bush would be allowed to own firearm and White
would not when both women had been adjudicated as mentally defective.
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were “sufficiently exceptional” to warrant forcible medication.204 The court found
that they were not:
White is a non-violent detainee who has served more than the entirety of her
likely sentence in pre-trial detention, and in onerous conditions at that. The
alleged victims of her crimes, which were solely property crimes, would not
likely benefit or be made whole in any way by her prosecution. She is neither a
danger to herself nor to the public, nor will she ever be able to purchase a
gun.205
Given these findings, the court concluded the government interest in prose-
cuting this serious crime was outweighed by special circumstances. Importantly,
the court tried to draw a line differentiating routine cases from sufficiently
exceptional ones. White was an “all-too-common, non-violent, long-detained
defendant,” not a danger to society, and her victims would not be made whole if
she were convicted.206 Medicating a defendant like White “would risk making
‘routine’ the kind of drastic resort to forced medication for restoring competency
that the Supreme Court gave no hint of approving in Sell.”207 Her case therefore
was not sufficiently exceptional to warrant forcible medication.
The White approach places the emphasis in the Sell test where it belongs, with
the individual circumstances of the case. It also opens the door to consideration
of additional facets of an individual’s circumstance, particularly those cases where
the defendant’s crime appears intimately connected to his mental illness. A
defendant whose alleged crimes reflect nothing more than the nonsensical wander-
ings of a troubled mind may well fall on the less important side of the spectrum.
Several courts have already refused to medicate defendants when the crimes
seem to be a manifestation of their mental illness. In United States v. Weinberg, for
example, the Western District of New York found Weinberg’s threatening a judicial
officer to be “quite consistent with Weinberg’s illness,” and the fact that he sent the
threats to government officials and the FBI “suggests that his actual intent to
commit the act was delusional as well.”208 The court held the government’s
interest in prosecuting this crime was not important.
The circumstances in United States v. Lindauer were even more extreme. In
Lindauer, the defendant believed she was a back door channel between the United
States and Iraq for events in the Middle East. She was then charged with acting as
an unregistered agent of the Iraqi government and engaging in forbidden financial
transactions with Iraq.209 The court found important government interests were not
204. Id. at 421.
205. Id. at 421–22.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 422.
208. 743 F. Supp. 2d 234, 237 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
209. 448 F. Supp. 2d 558, 560, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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at stake because it could not prove an essential element of the crime—that the
defendant had influenced people: “The indictment charges only what it describes
as an unsuccessful attempt to influence an unnamed government official, and the
record shows that even lay people recognize that she is seriously disturbed.”210
Thus, when confronted with the facts of the individual case—that the defendant
was seriously mentally disturbed and her actions were directly related to that
disturbance—in cases where there was no physical harm to property or individu-
als, some courts have found that the government interest at stake does not rise to a
level that justifies medication. More courts can and should follow this path.
A renewed emphasis on the facts of the individual case is, of course, not the
only solution to the problem of overmedication in the years following Sell. For ex-
ample, one scholar noted an analysis more similar to the balancing test conducted
for Fourth Amendment inquiries would better protect incompetent defendants
from unreasonable harms imposed by involuntary medication.211 Under this
approach, courts would abandon the categorical thresholds imposed by the Sell test
in favor of an inquiry that weighs the defendant’s interest in avoiding the harms of
involuntary medication directly against the government’s interest in rendering the
defendant competent to stand trial.212
While this approach would more accurately mirror the test set out for other due
process claims, and would also succeed in circumscribing the number of defen-
dants involuntarily medicated to those rare cases in which it is warranted, it would
require Supreme Court intervention—and reversal of its precedent—to implement.
The Court has given no indication that it desires to wade back into the involuntary
medication waters. The proposal in this Article, by contrast, recognizes that the
seeds for a solution to the overmedication problem rest in the test itself and its
requirement that courts consider the facts of the individual case when conducting
an involuntary medication inquiry.
V. CONCLUSION
Herbert J. Evans was incarcerated for four years before two separate juries
found him not guilty of either threatening a federal judge or assaulting a federal
employee.213 In that lengthy time between the day when he first entered the USDA
office and his acquittal, two different federal district court judges assessed his case.
One decided that the government interest in prosecuting him for assault on a
federal employee was not sufficiently important to warrant medication, while the
other decided that his later crime of threatening a federal judge cleared that bar.214
210. Id. at 572.
211. Klein, supra note 178, at 205.
212. Id.
213. United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 418 (4th Cir. 2010).
214. United States v. Evans, No. 102CR00136, 2004 WL 533473, at *2 (W.D. Va. Mar. 18, 2004);
United States v. Evans, 293 F. Supp. 2d 668, 674 (W.D. Va. 2003).
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His case went up to the Fourth Circuit twice: the first time, the lower court
insufficiently laid out the plan for medication, but on the second trip, a more
detailed medication plan was given the stamp of approval.215 Despite concerns
about treating Evans “as an individual,” the court never looked to the facts of
his individual case, such as his long history of mental illness or the likely
connection between his mental illness and his alleged crime. Had the court
done so, it may have found that Evans’s case was not sufficiently exceptional to
warrant medication, saving Evans from four years of imprisonment and multiple
injections of unwanted medication. It also could have avoided the waste of
government resources that accompanied such a lengthy prosecution with no
resulting conviction.
The place for such considerations is within the analysis of the government
interest factor. It is here that the Supreme Court incorporated a robust inquiry into
the circumstances of the case that could potentially undermine the importance of
the interest at stake. Yet, extensive analyses of this factor are missing from many
court decisions in lieu of lengthy discussions of medication specifics. Overmedica-
tion of defendants who are “all-too-common, non-violent, [and] long-detained” is
the result.216
To solve this problem, courts must analyze the individual facts of a case under
the government interest factor to identify the sufficiently exceptional cases that
warrant medication. Sell provided an avenue for courts to deeply consider a de-
fendant’s individual right to be free from the physical and psychological intrusion
of antipsychotic medications. Widespread adoption of an individualized approach,
the approach that Sell intended, would turn involuntary medication of defendants
from almost routine—as it is now—into the “rare” circumstance envisioned by the
Supreme Court.
215. United States v. Evans, 199 F. App’x 290 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227 (4th Cir.
2005).
216. White, 620 F.3d at 421–22.
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